Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory without Homeostatic Mechanisms: Two Recent Attempts and their Costs by Onishi, Yukinori & Serpico, Davide
Vol.:(0123456789)




Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory without Homeostatic 
Mechanisms: Two Recent Attempts and their Costs
Yukinori Onishi1  · Davide Serpico2 
 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
The homeostatic property cluster theory (HPC) is widely influential for its ability to 
account for many natural-kind terms in the life sciences. However, the notion of home-
ostatic mechanism has never been fully explicated. In 2009, Carl Craver interpreted the 
notion in the sense articulated in discussions on mechanistic explanation and pointed out 
that the HPC account equipped with such notion invites interest-relativity. In this paper, 
we analyze two recent refinements on HPC: one that avoids any reference to the causes of 
the clustering of properties and one that replaces homeostatic mechanisms with causal net-
works represented by causal graphs. We argue that the former is too slender to account for 
some inductive inference in science and the latter, thicker account invites interest-relativity, 
as the original HPC does. This suggests that human interest will be an un-eliminative part 
of a satisfactory account of natural kindness. We conclude by discussing the implication of 
interest-relativity to the naturalness, reality, or objectivity of kinds and indicating an over-
looked aspect of natural kinds that requires further studies.
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1 Introduction
The homeostatic property cluster theory (HPC) was initially introduced by Richard Boyd 
in response to what he takes to be Ian Hacking’s (1991) ‘challenge’ that property-cluster 
kinds fail to count as natural kinds because, as far as they have fuzzy boundaries, “what 
puts things into a family is not nature but people in concert” (Boyd 1991, 128).1 In order to 
defend property-cluster kinds from this challenge and to find some natural bases for them, 
Boyd (1991) postulated the existence of a homeostatic mechanism capable of explaining 
why those properties are statistically associated with each other and shared by the members 
of a given kind. In this view, homeostatic mechanisms make natural kinds flexible and sta-
ble at the same time: on the one hand, they are flexible enough to admit a certain degree of 
variability in the properties displayed by different members of the kind; on the other hand, 
they are stable enough to play a role in our epistemic practices, such as induction and pre-
diction. Categorization of property clusters into kinds will be, then, based on those under-
lying homeostatic mechanisms rather than judgments of “people in concert.”
The flexibility and stability of homeostatic mechanisms make them suited to account 
for entities in the biological domain, where boundaries and membership criteria can be 
messy. This characteristic has led many scholars to embrace HPC to investigate the reli-
ability of many biological and psychological concepts, such as mental disorders (Kendler 
et al. 2011), cognition (Buckner 2015), innateness (Khalidi 2016), and intelligence (Ser-
pico 2018). In his 1999 paper (p. 143), Boyd accepted that properties in some HPC kinds 
can stick together without the involvement of any homeostatic mechanism. However, the 
reference to homeostatic mechanisms has traditionally constituted the distinctive mark of 
HPC theories (on this point, see Lipski 2020), intended as a realist response to Hacking’s 
challenge. Thus, in this paper, we follow Carl Craver (2009, 578) and mostly focus on this 
prevalent interpretation of HPC, according to which properties of natural kinds are held 
together by a kind-defining, shared (set of) homeostatic mechanism(s).
Despite its importance within the HPC framework, the concept of homeostatic mecha-
nism has never been entirely clarified. According to Boyd himself, a homeostatic mecha-
nism may or may not be ‘underlying’; it can derive from a single cause or not; and it may 
be internal or external to a given system. For instance, as Kendler et al. (2011, 1149) ask, 
which of the diverse possible causal processes should we emphasize when we construct a 
psychiatric nosology? Although this issue is not solely conceptual, without a clear notion 
of homeostatic mechanism HPC would lose an important part of its appeal.
Looking for a deeper understanding of HPC, some scholars have interpreted the notion of 
homeostatic mechanism as corresponding to the notion of mechanism delineated by Macha-
mer et al. (2000) and developed by the theorists of mechanistic explanation (on this point 
see Khalidi 2016, 327). Hereafter, we will refer to this notion as mechanisms in the strict 
sense or Strict Mechanisms, according to which a mechanism is “a structure performing 
a function in virtue of its component parts, component operations, and their organization 
[as the] orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenom-
ena” (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, 43). In Craver’s more intuitive definition, “mecha-
nisms are entities and activities organized together such that they do something […] that the 
1 Hacking does not seem to be explicitly raising this challenge. For instance, he writes “I have nowhere 
implied that [common nouns that work by family resemblances] are not natural kinds” (1991, 123), although 
he also conjectures that “a great many family resemblance nouns […] may properly be called social kinds” 
(1991, 123).
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components could not do on their own” (Craver 2009, 582). For instance, spatial-memory 
tasks in rats can be analyzed in terms of how the hippocampus forms a ‘map’ of a maze, 
how this map is ‘encoded’ in hippocampal neural networks, how synaptic changes are real-
ized by the opening of NMDA receptors, and so forth (see Craver 2015).2
By interpreting Boyd’s homeostatic mechanisms as Strict Mechanisms, some scholars 
have questioned the suitability of HPC for carving nature at its joints. In particular, Carl 
Craver (2009) developed three challenges against HPC equipped with the notion of Strict 
Mechanisms (Strict HPC, hereafter), according to which the identification of mechanisms 
is highly dependent on our explanatory practices and, thus, Strict HPC inherits the mark 
of human interest associated with Strict Mechanism; that is, the resulting taxonomy will 
be relative to the purpose of inquiry at hand.3 Another challenge to HPC was provided by 
Matthew Slater (2015), who argued that many putative natural kinds in the special sciences 
lack anything like a homeostatic mechanism.
These difficulties have led to two sorts of responses from the philosophical community. 
On the one hand, some scholars, such as Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2018), have replaced 
the notion of homeostatic mechanisms with other causal notions in order to offer a unified 
account of natural kinds. On the other hand, scholars such as Slater (2015) have rejected the 
notion of homeostatic mechanisms as well as any other causal notions in their characteriza-
tion of natural kindness. We will take Khalidi’s and Slater’s accounts as two alternative, 
paradigmatic ways to characterize natural kindness: the former account points at the neces-
sity of refining the metaphysical, causal component of the natural kinds theory; the latter, 
instead, focuses on the epistemic side of the coin, with the aim of clarifying what feature of 
property clusters enables us to perform inductive inference. Does Khalidi’s improvement 
on HPC save it from Craver’s challenge of interest-relativity and Slater’s challenge of lim-
ited applicability?4 If not, does Slater’s metaphysically slender account provide a satisfac-
tory account of inductive practice concerning natural kinds? In this paper, we will analyze 
these questions and argue that the answer is negative in both cases. These analyses will 
lead us to the conclusion that at least some aspects of natural kindness require the reference 
to some sort of underlying process, and that interest-relativity will be an ineliminable part 
of an account of natural kindness.
2 Depending on different accounts, the definition of mechanism can be more or less stringent. Indeed, as 
Craver (2018) notices, scholars working on mechanisms “have pursued diverse interests and undertaken 
different, sometimes incompatible, commitments”—often standing back from metaphysical issues. We shall 
analyze this point in Sect. 2.
3 In this paper, we will focus on this sort of interest-relativity identified by Craver (2009) and discuss 
whether Khalidi’s (2018) improvement of HPC can avoid Craver’s challenges. We will briefly discuss the 
relationship between interest-relativity and the naturalness, reality, or objectivity of kinds in the conclu-
sion. It is worth noting that Boyd (1999) accepted some form of interest-relativity (we thank an anonymous 
reviewer for pointing this out). However, as we noted above, many understand the HPC theory as capable of 
providing unconventional bases for categorizing property clusters, and thus addressing Hacking’s objection.
4 It should be noted that the motivation behind Khalidi’s refinement of original HPC is not the interest-
relativity that Craver points out, but rather HPC’s limited generality. Also, in his earlier account, Kha-
lidi explicitly acknowledges pluralism of natural kinds in different domains of inquiry (2013, 219–220). 
As such, it is not our purpose to criticize his account as failing to achieve what it meant to. Rather, our 
aim is to examine the exact ways in which interest-relativity arises in his more articulated account that 
employs causal graphs (Khalidi 2018). This examination is worth it especially because Khalidi does not 
discuss Craver’s challenges in his 2018 account. Indeed, as we shall argue, employment of causal graphs 
invites additional contingency in fixing taxonomies. Jantzen (2015) also discusses whether a weaker notion 
of mechanism can save HPC from one of Craver’s challenges (we thank Jun Otsuka for pointing this out). 
We shall consider Jantzen’s analysis in Sect. 3.
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The argument goes as follows. In Sect. 2, we summarize Craver’s and Slater’s challenges 
to HPC and argue that there are good reasons to suspect that those challenges depend on 
the notion of mechanism that they assume to explicate HPC, namely, the notion of Strict 
Mechanism. To see whether an alternative notion can save HPC from those challenges, in 
Sect.  3, we analyze Khalidi’s causal network node account (CNN)—which replaces the 
notion of mechanism with causal processes as captured by causal graphs—and argue that 
CNN faces the same difficulties as Strict HPC despite the employment of a looser notion 
of mechanism. This leads us, in Sect.  4, to consider an alternative, plausible account of 
natural kindness, namely, Slater’s stable property cluster account (SPC). However, as we 
shall argue, SPC is too slender to account for some inductive inference on natural kinds, 
for consideration of underlying process is indispensable for the rational reconstruction 
of such inference. Drawing on these considerations, in Sect.  5 we conclude that at least 
some aspects of natural kindness require the reference to some sort of underlying process, 
and that interest-relativity will be an ineliminable part of an account of natural kindness. 
Although it is often pointed out that relativity to the purpose of inquiry is compatible with 
the naturalness, reality or objectivity of categories, we shall suggest that treating all inter-
est-relative categories as equally ‘natural’ insofar as they are parasitic on some objective 
causal feature will miss pragmatic aspects of the notion of natural kinds.
2  HPC with Strict Mechanisms and Its Difficulties
One of the foremost challenges to HPC comes from Craver (2009). Here, the author draws 
on the apparent impossibility of making clear-cut, unambiguous distinctions between 
mechanisms and, thus, of identifying interest-independent categories in nature related to 
such mechanisms. Overall, Craver examines whether the HPC theory can be grounded in 
the philosophy of mechanism, and the answer is negative: if the identity of a given HPC 
kind is based on a Strict Mechanism, then the HPC account is unable to achieve its goal—
i.e., identifying purely objective taxonomies.
Within the common interpretation of HPC discussed by Craver, drawing a taxonomy 
that ‘carves nature at its joints’ requires an understanding of the relationship between a 
property cluster and the homeostatic mechanism that realizes it. For instance, if one dis-
covers that a given mental disorder, e.g., schizophrenia, is underpinned by two kinds of 
mechanisms instead of one, then one should split schizophrenia up into two disorders. By 
contrast, if one discovers that two different disorders, say, major and minor depression, are 
underpinned by one kind of mechanism instead of two, then one should lump the two types 
of depression into one.5 In such a way, the refined taxonomy will more accurately reflect 
the causal structure of the world and will better serve prediction, generalization and, in the 
case of diseases and mental disorders, prevention and treatment. However, for this taxon-
omy to be purely objective, there need to be purely objective ways to tell when mechanisms 
are of the same kind and when they are different, and it is here that, according to Craver, 
problems come along.
5 These two strategies correspond to what McKusick (1969) calls splitting and lumping strategies, respec-
tively, which are widely adopted in debates on the causal basis of psychological traits (see Craver 2009, 
581–582). For recent criticisms to the view that scientific taxonomies are to be revised for maximizing the 
homogeneity of their projectible properties and underlying mechanisms, see Lipski (2020).
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Alongside other scholars (e.g., Glennan 1996; 2002), Craver embraces the view that 
mechanistic parthood ultimately depends on the explanatory context: parts are always parts 
with respect to a decomposition framed by reference to some property or activity displayed 
by the whole they belong to. Furthermore, a mechanism is always a mechanism for a given 
phenomenon that plays some role in our explanatory practices (see Craver 2015). What 
factors, among the many influencing the behavior of a mechanism, should be included 
among its components (i.e., what are the boundaries of a mechanism)? What description 
of a mechanism, from a very detailed to a very schematic one, is the most appropriate? In 
Craver’s view, any choice will depend on the problem at hand. In other words, the appro-
priate characterization of a mechanism depends on our epistemic interest: “In the absence 
of any purposes, goals, and forms in nature, there is no principle for dividing the organism 
into working parts” (Craver 2009, 589).6 Craver argues that this applies to kind-underpin-
ning mechanisms as well and, consequently, HPC is doomed to inherit this sort of interest-
relativity. Let us call these difficulties the boundary problem and the degree of abstraction 
problem, respectively.
In addition to these problems with the identification of mechanisms, Craver points at 
cases in which there is no one-to-one correspondence between property clusters and the 
mechanisms realizing them. For example, several etiological mechanisms can lead to a 
single constitutive mechanism that is directly responsible for a property cluster (e.g., in 
the case of HIV infection, the same cluster of symptoms can be brought about by differ-
ent etiological causes). On the other hand, the same etiological mechanism can give rise 
to different constitutive mechanisms (and, hence, diverse property clusters) depending on 
the context (e.g., in tertiary syphilis). In cases like these, the causal pathway connecting 
etiological mechanisms, constitutive mechanisms, and property clusters is not linear (see 
Fig. 1), and the resulting taxonomy will be different depending on which mechanism one 
attends to. What mechanism underpins a given natural kind, then? If conventional factors 
are indispensable for settling the issue, the resulting taxonomy will be inevitably affected 
by conventional factors as well. Let us call this problem the no one-to-one problem.
To summarize, Craver identifies three major problems with the HPC account equipped 
with the notion of Strict Mechanism:
• The Boundary Problem: Indeterminacy regarding factors that should be included 
among the components of kind-defining mechanisms;
• The Degree of Abstraction Problem: Indeterminacy regarding the degree of abstraction 
at which kind-defining mechanisms are characterized, from very detailed to very sche-
matic;
• The No One-to-one Problem: Indeterminacy regarding a kind-defining mechanism that 
arises from non-linear causal pathways between etiological mechanisms, constitutive 
mechanisms, and property clusters.
In Craver’s view, human interests are indispensable for resolving these indeterminacies; 
thus, taxonomies involve perspectival elements with respect to the sort of mechanism one 
is interested in. The preference of one over another will depend on the context of inquiry 
and purpose, e.g., prevention, treatment, or explanation.
6 For a discussion on realist and antirealist accounts of mechanisms, see Kaiser (2017). Here, we will 
not focus on this topic as it concerns the identification of mechanisms per se. We are rather interested in 
whether and how problems in mechanistic philosophy affect the natural kinds theory.
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Another challenge to HPC, provided by Slater (2015), is that the notion of homeostatic 
mechanism is too narrow to account for the natural kindness of many scientific kinds. 
Thus, Slater says, “Many scientifically important categories—such as elementary parti-
cles or chemical species—are associated with clusters of properties whose stability is not 
plausibly maintained by causal homeostatic mechanisms” (2015, 391). The same applies to 
biological species: although common selective factors may explain the similarities between 
the members of a given species, “it is not obvious that these explanations […] can be inter-
preted in mechanistic terms” (391).
It is worth noting that the difficulties identified by Craver and Slater could be due to the 
notion of mechanism the authors assume to explicate HPC, namely, the notion of Strict 
Mechanism. While these authors are fair enough to assume this notion—especially given 
that Boyd himself had not offered any detailed account of homeostatic mechanisms—their 
criticisms may suggest only that the strict notion of mechanism is unsuited for clarifying 
the HPC theory.
Indeed, there are good reasons to suspect that such a notion is unsuited for this purpose. 
As we mentioned in Sect. 1, Strict Mechanisms can be described as local, non-aggregative 
systems (e.g., Craver 2015) or wholes materially composed of concrete parts arranged in 
such a way to produce a specific behavior or function (e.g., Kaiser 2017). However, it has 
been pointed out that the notion understood in such a strict sense invites some peculiar 
problems when applied to higher-level aspects of living beings (see DiFrisco 2017; Eronen 
2013; Levy 2014; Potochnik 2017). For example, can the relationship between molecular 
and psychological levels be explained in mechanistic terms? Is an organism a constitutive 
part of its population in the same sense that a cell is a constitutive part of an organ? Since 
many questions about the mechanistic framework remain unaddressed (especially with 
respect to the sorts of higher-level phenomena with which discussions of natural kinds are 
often concerned, such as psychological traits), it is not reasonable to rely on the notion of 
Strict Mechanism to explicate the metaphysical basis of natural kinds. In this respect, it is 
not surprising that HPC faces trouble when the notion of homeostatic mechanism is inter-
preted as equivalent to the notion of Strict Mechanism.
Slater recognizes this aspect but challenges HPCers to provide an alternative inter-
pretation of homeostatic mechanisms (2015, 393). Craver, in turn, admits the possibil-
ity of some alternative interpretation of HPC that is devoid of mechanism, according to 
which “natural kinds are the kinds appearing in generalizations that correctly describe the 
causal structure of the world regardless of whether a mechanism explains the clustering of 
Fig. 1  (a) A case in which different etiological mechanisms lead to the same constitutive mechanism, which 
gives rise to a property cluster P1, …, Pn (b) A case in which the same etiological mechanism leads to dif-
ferent constitutive mechanisms that give rise to different property clusters
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properties definitive of the kind” (2009, 579). However, he dismisses such an interpreta-
tion as “clearly not Boyd’s view” and argues that, in the absence of mechanisms, such an 
account of natural kinds would be unable to explain “why the kind is so useful for predic-
tion, explanation, and control in a way that conventionalism cannot” (2009, 579). Recently, 
however, Khalidi (2018) proposed an account of natural kinds that replaces homeostatic 
mechanisms with a looser causal notion—namely, causal processes characterized by causal 
graphs. Does the replacement of homeostatic mechanisms with causal processes save HPC 
from Craver’s and Slater’s challenges? In the next section, we shall turn to this problem.
3  Can a Looser Notion of Mechanism Save HPC?
3.1  The Causal Network Node Account
Khalidi (2018) emphasizes that causal considerations play a central role in our recognition 
of real kinds in nature. The author reminds us that natural kind terms can allow prediction 
and induction (in brief, they are projectable) because they can track causal processes. This 
is arguably what Boyd had originally in mind, too: “we are able to identify true generaliza-
tions in science and in everyday life because we are able to accommodate our inductive 
practices to the causal factors that sustain them” (Boyd 1999, 148). Notably, however, Kha-
lidi highlights that the notion of homeostatic mechanism should be understood metaphori-
cally rather than literally and proposes a view of natural kinds that is devoid of the literal 
interpretation of the terms of ‘mechanism’ and ‘homeostasis.’ This looser version of HPC 
would preserve the emphasis on the causes from which property clusters originate with no 
need of providing a detailed notion of homeostatic mechanism. In this view, natural kinds 
are highly connected nodes in causal networks.
Khalidi acknowledges that, “in many cases, we observe a web-like network of causal 
relationships whereby some causal processes interact with other causal processes” (2018, 
1387). For instance, various properties of gold do not derive straightforwardly from the 
‘essence’ of gold, but rather are present only if accompanied by other properties, such as 
temperature and atmospheric pressure. Khalidi holds that these causal networks can be 
captured by causal graphs, which are ordered pairs of vertices (representing the relata of 
the causal relation) and edges (representing the relations of direct causation).7 Then, he 
argues that natural kind categories “consist of highly connected nodes in causal networks 
[that are] represented by those vertices in directed causal graphs from which many edges 
originate, whether directly or indirectly, leading to other vertices” (Khalidi 2018, 1387; see 
also Woodward 2003). Following Reydon (2015), let us call this the causal network node 
account (CNN, hereafter).
This characterization of natural kinds makes sense of their fuzzy boundaries: that is, the 
loose clustering of properties avoids any association of natural kinds with property sets that 
are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the kind’s instantiation. Moreover, this 
account appears to be more general than Boyd’s, which, in Khalidi’s view, seems mostly 
reflective of kind terms employed in “the special sciences, such as biology, geology, and 
7 More specifically, the relata can be one or more core properties or derivative properties. Derivative prop-
erties are those caused by core properties, either directly or indirectly, when accompanied with some other 
properties or background conditions (see Khalidi 2018, Fig. 1).
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psychology” (Khalidi 2018, 1386).8 Thus, Khalidi’s view arguably extends to most kinds in 
science, including both uncontroversial natural kinds (e.g., chemical elements) and conten-
tious kinds in the special and social sciences.9
Like Boyd’s HPC, Khalidi’s account aims to fulfil two important requirements of a realist 
theory of natural kinds: first, the reference to causality enables us to discriminate between 
property sets that are natural kinds and those conventionally tied together; second, the causal 
relationship between properties (or instances of properties) constitutes the ontological ground 
for the projectability of the corresponding predicates as well as explanatory and taxonomic 
practices in science. Is CNN free from Slater’s and Craver’s challenges against Strict HPC, 
and does it provide a view of natural taxonomies capable of avoiding interest-relativity?
3.2  How Promising Is the Causal Network Node Account?
As we mentioned in Sect.  2, Slater argues that HPC, once equipped with the notion of 
Strict Mechanism, becomes too restrictive to account for various putative kinds in science. 
By employing a looser notion of mechanism, CNN seems to be able to bypass Slater’s chal-
lenges. As seen in the previous section, CNN is applicable to chemical kinds, such as gold. 
Likewise, CNN is likely to be able to handle evolutionary cases: indeed, whether natural 
selection is the cause of evolutionary changes or, rather, the statistical result of some causal 
process, the general process of phenotypic change itself is a causal process and, hence, it is 
likely to be captured by causal graphs. Khalidi does not deny that in some cases, the associ-
ation of properties is a bare fact without any further causal stories to be told, but, he argues, 
“there is no reason to think that this will hold of anything but the most fundamental entities 
in the universe” (2018, 1390). For these reasons, Khalidi’s account looks more promising 
than Strict HPC in terms of general applicability.
Regarding Craver’s challenges, the general question is whether CNN requires perspecti-
val elements in its delineation of natural kinds. In what follows, we will argue that Craver’s 
three challenges (i.e., the degree of abstraction problem, the boundary problem, and the no 
one-to-one problem) afflict CNN even though it makes a shift from Strict Mechanisms to 
the more liberal notion of causal process described by causal graphs.
Let us start by investigating whether CNN can overcome the degree of abstraction prob-
lem. Considering that this problem mostly arises with respect to the characterization of the 
components of a mechanism, and given that Khalidi does not need to identify a mecha-
nism in the strict sense, his account may appear to be free from the problem. However, a 
problem arises with respect to the characterization of causal graphs, for modeling causal 
networks inevitably involves some degree of abstraction. Jantzen (2015) raises a version of 
such problem with respect to what he calls the causal kinds account, a view that “define[s] 
natural kinds in terms of a network of causal relations: every system instantiating the same 
causal structure amongst instances of the same variable types is in the same kind” (2015, 
8 Note, however, that Boyd (1999) suggests that social structure like feudalism or capitalism, too, might be 
accounted for by the HPC framework (we thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out).
9 Remarkably, Khalidi argues for the central role of causal processes even in cases where other interpreta-
tions are possible, e.g., the cases of copying, convention, and history (see Millikan 2005). The only kind 
of entities falling outside Khalidi’s framework are elementary particles or “fundamental entities in the uni-
verse,” where the coexistence of properties might represent a “brute fact” (see Khalidi 2018, 1390; see also 
Chakravartty 2007, 171).
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3625–3626). According to Jantzen, “If a kind is characterized by a particular causal structure 
specified at the finest level of detail […] then kind induction becomes trivial.[…] [I]t may 
seem obvious that we need to take a more inclusive view of which causal systems to lump 
together into kinds. The question is how we can do so without running into Craver’s worry” 
(2015, 3626).
Considering that CNN seems to be a specific way to implement the causal kinds account 
in terms of causal graphs, it is likely that the same problem applies here. But how does Crav-
er’s worry concerning Strict HPC transpose to CNN, exactly? Although Khalidi focuses on 
causal properties and causal processes instead of entities and their activities, entities can be 
seen as cohesions of properties, and the abstraction of entities means putting aside some of 
the properties each token has. This possibility suggests that a problem regarding the charac-
terization of a type of entity is likely to arise in its representation with causal graphs, too.
To see this, recall that the original degree of abstraction problem points at the indeterminacy 
of the appropriate degree of abstraction in characterizing a mechanism, depending on which 
two instances of mechanisms are regarded as the same type of mechanism (or not) despite hav-
ing some differences. But, if those instances are different in some features of their components 
(i.e., the entities or their activities), they must be different in some properties of the entities as 
well, and, arguably, those differences are present at some levels of abstraction but absent at oth-
ers. Then, the same question arises: what is the appropriate level at which to characterize a type 
of causal process?10 Thus, Craver’s challenge regarding the degree of abstraction applies almost 
straightforwardly to CNN as well. Simply replacing the components of Strict Mechanisms with 
their properties does not seem to solve the degree of abstraction problem.11,12
What about the boundary problem? While the original boundary problem concerns the 
components that should enter a kind-constitutive mechanism, a similar problem arises in 
10 Note that, according to Khalidi, “[t]he networks represented in these directed graphs represent types 
of causal process rather than tokens, though the graphs are drawn on the basis of token observations of 
sequences of property instances” (Khalidi 2018, 1387).
11 One may argue that the appropriate causal graphs should contain all and only those properties that make 
some causal differences and that this constraint will determine the appropriate level of abstraction. How-
ever, as Craver objects, “to solve [the degree of abstraction] problem, it will not suffice to demand that 
the differences in underlying mechanisms must make a causal difference to (or be otherwise explanatorily 
relevant to) the behavior of a mechanism as a whole because any detectable difference in the underlying 
mechanism must make some such causal difference. Likewise, one cannot object that the difference made 
is too small or insignificant because such judgments depend on our assessment of which differences are 
too small to be relevant for our interests, not on the objective features of the causal structure of the world 
alone” (2009, 586; emphasis added).
12 There are some attempts within the machine learning literature to automatically extract “macro-level” 
causal structures from “micro-level” experimental data (Chalupka et  al. 2016; we thank an anonymous 
reviewer for bringing this literature to our attention). Although these developments in machine learning 
might mitigate the degree of abstraction problem in the future, some general remarks are in order. First, 
even when those algorithms work automatically, some arbitrariness often remains regarding the implemen-
tation of algorithms and the choice of hyper parameters, and these choices could be largely affected by 
pragmatic factors. As Chalupka and colleagues say, “There are many possible alternatives to [Algorithm 1], 
each with different advantages and disadvantages” (2016, 365). Second, even if those algorithms can auto-
matically extract some causally related features, it is another question whether we can interpret them (on 
the problem of interpretability, see, e.g., Lipton 2018). Thus, taxonomies resulting from such attempts can 
be very different from ours and it can turn out that many of our kind-terms in science are relative to our 
interest. With these general concerns in mind, it requires careful scrutiny whether the algorithms can pro-
vide an interest-independent solution to the degree of abstraction problem.
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Khalidi’s account with respect to the properties (or conditions) that enter a kind-constitu-
tive vertex in the causal graph. To see this, it is worth noting that there is a sort of indeter-
minacy with CNN regarding how to draw a causal graph.
According to Khalidi, the process that property Q, together with the background con-
dition C, produces property P can be depicted as in Fig.  2. On the other hand, Khalidi 
also allows that “[s]ome vertices may also represent disjunctive combinations of properties 
(e.g., Q1 & [Q2 ∨ Q3])” (2018, 1387). This rule is probably introduced to accommodate 
cases such as gold, where the core property consists of, according to Khalidi, its atomic 
number plus one of the mass numbers that enable the substance to be stable.
However, this implies that there can be alternative representations of the same causal 
process, even when we put aside the degree of abstraction problem and attend to the same 
set of properties. For example, suppose that property Q1, together with either Q2 or Q3, can 
give rise to property P. As shown in Fig. 3, this can be represented in three different ways.
While these three alternative causal graphs may be inter-translatable, the problem is that 
the number of vertices in the graph and the number of edges from them may be different in 
each representation. This problem will raise a concern for the account of natural kinds that 
identifies natural kinds with “those vertices in directed causal graphs from which many edges 
originate” (Khalidi 2018, 1387); for example, it is unclear whether (Q1 & [Q2 ∨ Q3]) consti-
tutes a single kind or (Q1 & Q2) and (Q1 & Q3) constitute separate kinds. The whole structure 
of a causal graph may vary more drastically when more properties are involved in the graph.
This ambiguity leads to the boundary problem that afflicted the Strict HPC. Recall that 
the boundary problem questions what factors, among those that have some influence on 
the behavior of a mechanism, should be considered as components of the kind-constitutive 
mechanism. Khalidi points out that various properties that a chemical substance exhibits 
are present only whereby they are accompanied by other properties, such as background 
conditions. Such conditions are represented in the causal graph, as in Fig.  2. However, 
given the alternative ways of drawing causal graphs, why not include background con-
ditions in the vertex and represent it as (Q & C)? Additionally, for cases such as those 
described in Fig. 3, it is not clear whether Q2 and Q3 are part of kind-constitutive vertex or 
they are merely conditioning properties such that once a kind of objects (as defined by pos-
session of Q1) possess them, they will exhibit property P.
Consider the case of gold. Khalidi correctly notices that various properties of gold depend 
not only on its atomic number but also on its mass numbers and that a token of gold can 
exhibit different properties under different conditions (e.g., different temperatures). Let us 
suppose that there is a case such that a tiny difference in temperature does not affect its result-
ing property P. Let Q be a conjunction of gold’s atomic number plus disjunction of mass 
Fig. 2  A directed causal graph that describes the causal process where property Q, together with back-
ground condition C, produces property P 
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numbers with which gold remains stable,13 and let T1 and T2 be different values of tempera-
ture.14 When the difference between T1 and T2 is negligible with respect to a certain effect P, 
Q together with either T1 or T2 will give rise to property P. Then, the question is whether we 
should regard Q as a vertex that represents a kind ‘gold,’ whether we should, instead, include 
a term (T1 ∨ T2) in the vertex and regard (Q & [T1 ∨ T2]) as constituting a kind, or whether we 
should write them separately (i.e., as (Q & T1) and (Q & T2)) and regard each of them (e.g., 
gold at different temperatures) as being a distinct natural kind. The causal graph account 
leaves the door open for this sort of ambiguity that arises from the graph-drawing rules, and 
there is no assurance that such ambiguity will resolve in every case.15
The proponents of CNN may want to resolve this indeterminacy by offering some reason, 
either conventional or ‘natural,’ to pick out one of the alternative ways of depicting causal 
graphs as canonical. For example, CNNers may object that such ambiguity would disap-
pear once further graph-drawing rules are introduced. However, it would be problematic if 
the number of vertices in a causal graph (and hence the number of natural kinds we iden-
tify) varies depending on such a conventional (i.e., interest-relative) matter. Alternatively, 
CNNers may contend that some properties can be ‘naturally’ regarded as belonging to kind-
constitutive vertices while others cannot be. For example, one may argue that kind-consti-
tutive properties should be those that Khalidi calls ‘core properties.’ However, what, then, 
is the difference between core properties and other properties? Khalidi does not provide an 
Fig. 3  Three alternative ways to describe the same causal process such that property Q1, together with 
either Q2 or Q3, gives rise to property P 
13 That is, Q takes the form of (A & [M1 ∨ M2, …∨Mn]), where property A stands for gold’s atomic number 
and properties Mi (1≤ i ≤ n) stand for mass numbers with which gold remains stable.
14 Khalidi mentions in the explanation of the notation of core properties that they can “take on specific val-
ues (whether continuous or discrete, possibly binary)” (2018, 1387). Though this statement concerns core 
properties, there is no reason to think that this applies to core properties only.
15 One may object that the problematic case we submit is violating the graph-drawing rule intended by 
Woodward (2003), which Khalidi (2018) refers to. For Woodward intends that vertices represent variables, 
rather than their particular values, and causal relevance between variables is defined based on whether 
changes in one of them are conductive to changes in another (2003, 38–45). Thus, one may argue, we are 
mistaken in treating different values of temperature separately by T1 and T2. However, in Khalidi’s account, 
vertices seem to represent particular values of variables. For instance, Khalidi himself considers a specific 
value of atomic number as one of the core properties of gold (2018, 1384).
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exact definition of core properties other than that they are “primary causal properties” from 
which other causal properties (derivative properties) originate (2018, 1384).16 However, it is 
far from clear whether we can identify such primary properties in unambiguous ways. For 
instance, consider the case of spontaneous radio decay, in which Uranium-238 collapses 
into Thorium-234, popping out an Alpha particle. In this example, whatever property Tho-
rium-234 has is the result of this causal process, which in turn was generated by a property 
of Uranium-238. Does this mean that the properties of Thorium-234 are all secondary or 
derivative and, hence, Thorium-234 is not a natural kind? Khalidi discusses various ways 
of co-instantiation of core properties and admits that “the reason that the core properties 
cluster in the first place also appears to be causal in many, though not all, instances” (2018, 
1389). However, he does not explain why this fact does not strip them of the status of ‘pri-
mary’ properties. If what count as primary properties (and hence, the distinction between 
core properties and derivative properties) depends on the context of inquiry, reliance on this 
distinction would result in the interest-relativity of natural kinds that Craver contends.
Finally, let us examine the no one-to-one problem. Recall that this problem arises when 
there is no one-to-one relationship between etiological mechanisms and constitutive mech-
anisms that give rise to property clusters. Sometimes, different etiological mechanisms lead 
to the same constitutive mechanism (hence, they have the same property cluster); some-
times, depending on the context, the same etiological mechanism results in diverse consti-
tutive mechanisms that give rise to different property clusters. In these cases, the argument 
goes, the HPC would imply different categorization depending on which mechanism one 
attends to. Can CNN address this problem?
Khalidi discusses ‘etiological kinds,’ i.e., kinds wherein “the primary criterion for cate-
gorizing them as [its] members […] is etiology” (2018, 1394) and argues that most putative 
etiological kinds share causal properties as well and can thus be accommodated into his 
account. However, it is not clear in the first place how some etiological mechanisms (e.g., 
some type of sexual intercourse or, say, sharing syringes in the case of HIV infection) can 
be represented as vertices in causal graphs. What properties would the vertices include? 
How can complex social interactions and intertwined etiological pathways be modeled via 
causal graphs? There does not seem to be a straightforward answer to these questions.
But let us assume, for the sake of discussion, that etiological mechanisms can be rep-
resented as vertices in causal graphs. If so, the problematic cases that give raise to the 
no one-to-one problem could be represented with causal graphs by replacing mechanisms 
with vertices. In this case, CNN will advise different categorizations depending on which 
vertices one attends to in cases where different vertices (corresponding to etiological mech-
anisms) lead to the same vertex (corresponding to a constitutive mechanism), which gives 
rise to a property cluster, or in cases where the same vertex leads to various vertices, which 
gives rise to different property clusters.
It is worth noting that Khalidi himself emphasizes such a web-like manner of prop-
erty realizations.17 As such, the no one-to-one problem is not a minor anomaly for CNN. 
Rather, this suggests the general point that capturing a causal network is one thing and 
carving out kinds based on causal networks is quite another—likely contextual—matter. 
17 Khalidi says, “Natural kinds are not just concatenations of properties but are ordered hierarchies of prop-
erties, whose instances are related to one another as causes and effects in recurrent causal processes” (2018, 
1395).
16 For example, Khalidi says, “the primary causal properties of gold include atomic number 79 as well as a 
disjunction of mass numbers, which give rise, in turn, to a cluster of other causal properties (e.g., ionization 
energies, atomic radius, etc.)” (2018, 1384).
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Note also that Jantzen’s concern about the degree of abstraction problem is stated in gen-
eral terms, leveled at a broad class of causal kinds account. These points suggest that other 
variants of HPC that employ different characterizations of underlying causal process would 
face the same difficulty as long as they characterize natural taxonomies as underpinned by 
a certain part of a causal process, which is characterized at a certain level of abstraction.18
For the reasons provided in this section, CNN does not seem to save HPC from Craver’s 
challenges and the resulting interest-relativity of natural kinds.
3.3  Does It Help to Employ an Alternative Characterization of Causal Structures?
As we noted above, Jantzen (2015) discusses a causal kinds approach (of which CNN can 
be understood as a particular formulation), and made the similar point as what we call the 
degree of abstraction problem, alluding to Craver’s worry (2015, 3626). As an alternative, 
he proposes what he calls the dynamical kinds theory of natural kinds (DK, henceforth) 
that retains the emphasis on causal structures but characterizes them in a different, comple-
mentary way. Thus, it is worth briefly considering whether this alternative approach could 
remove the indeterminacies (and the resulting interest-relativity) that afflicts CNN.19
The central feature of DK is its focus on dynamical symmetries, that is, “transformations 
of a system to which the causal structure of that system is indifferent” (2015, 3761).20 A 
dynamical kind is then defined as “a class of systems of variables that share” those trans-
formations the members are indifferent to (3635).21 To take Jantzen’s example of chemical 
analysis, chemists specify constituents of unknown substances by following a decision tree 
like this: “First add reagent A and check to see if a precipitate forms. If there is a precipi-
tate, follow this or that sub-procedure to identify it. If no precipitate forms, add reagent B, 
and so on” (3629). In this example, the addition of reagents amounts to transformations to 
the system (i.e., the solution), and the constituent substance are classified according to their 
reactivity to those transformations. However, members of the resulting taxonomy would 
share not only their reactivity to the same transformations, but also their indifference to 
other transformations in the procedure. The DK approach defines natural kinds based on 
the latter shared feature: “[possession of the same collection of dynamical symmetries 
18 Note that Anjan Chakravartty, for instance, who also emphasizes the importance of causal process in 
delineating natural kinds, explicitly admits such interest-relativity (Chakravartty 2007, 175–176).
19 We thank one of the reviewers for suggesting to discuss this. It should be noted that Jantzen does not 
explicitly present his account as providing interest-independent bases for categorization; however, it is not 
unfair to see an attempt in such direction in his account, given that he draws on Craver’s (2009) challenge 
and presents his account partly as a solution to the problem. Also, though DK makes use of formal notions 
with exact definitions, the following discussion admittedly grosses over many of its carefully developed 
details for the sake of brevity. Our aim here is only to indicate that it remains to be discussed whether the 
DK account is free from the problems afflicting CNN.
20 Jantzen explains ‘transformations’ roughly as “a change of a physical system” (2015, 3631). A typical 
example in physics is rotation around a certain axis, but he treats as transformations operations such as 
changing pressure in a container and addition of chemicals to solutions, too (3630, 3634). ‘Indifference’ 
in the definition means that, with respect to another operation on some ‘index variable’ that characterizes 
the state of the system (e.g., time or concentration of some substance), the final state of the system is not 
affected by the order in which the transformation and the another operation is applied. See the example of 
chemical analysis below.
21 More precisely, the definition uses another formal notion, symmetry structures, and has an additional 
clause to exclude some trivial kinds of symmetries. See footnote #24.
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is] necessary and, to a limited extent, sufficient for induction” (2015, 3636) and thus, he 
claims, natural kinds are dynamical kinds.
The DK account certainly suggests an important approach to the analysis of natu-
ral kinds. However, it is not clear whether a focus on dynamical symmetries instead of 
causal structures can solve the problems with the causal kinds approach, especially given 
Jantzen’s remark that the causal and the dynamical symmetry accounts are “two comple-
mentary ways” to characterize a system (2015, 3629). Admittedly, Jantzen argues that 
systems exhibiting different causal structures could share the same dynamical symmetries 
(i.e., they can be indifferent to the same transformations) and hence, could belong to the 
same dynamical kind (3636). This would reduce the worry of categorizing every instance 
of causal structure as a distinct kind, and thus would mitigate the degree of abstraction 
problem to some extent.
Nevertheless, there seem to remain some indeterminacies concerning the characteriza-
tion of variables and transformations that serve as the bases for categorization, and it is 
plausible that human interest is required to resolve such indeterminacies. Notably, the pri-
mary examples of Jantzen come from chemistry and physics, or involve very simple bio-
logical systems governed by simple equations, such as bacterial colonies. In these contexts, 
the relevant variables and transformations are relatively clear and often known, e.g., in the 
form of decision trees. However, it is not clear whether the same procedure is unambigu-
ously applicable to categories in biology, where the transformations and variables charac-
terizing systems are less obvious, and individual differences are abundant.
Take humans, for example, each individual conceived as a system of variables. As is 
well known, some people exhibit allergic reaction to a certain substance, while others are 
indifferent to it. If exposure to the allergen counts as a transformation at all, the trans-
formation is a dynamical symmetry for the latter individuals (with respect to some index 
variables), while it is not for the others.22 That is, the two groups of people do not share a 
dynamical symmetry and, according to the DK theory, would belong to different kinds.
Although one may find it intuitive that people are categorized based on their different 
reactivity to a certain substance, given the number of possible transformations that affects 
people differently, such categorization strategy could end up with a plethora of natural 
kinds with very small numbers of members. For instance, there are many substances that 
can cause allergic reactions to some people (but not to others), and some people are allergic 
to more than one substance. There are also many transformations other than exposure to 
allergens that people react differently to, reflecting the wide range of individual differences 
among humans. Recall that DK defines kinds based on the shared set of transformations to 
which members are indifferent. Then, if we consider the full range of human individual dif-
ferences (as suggested by personalised medicine) and each of the possible combinations of 
all the transformations to which people are indifferent, this account would suggest catego-
rizing each individual as a distinct dynamical kind (this would be a plausible consequence 
of the fact that DK is an essentialist account, see Jantzen 2015, 3626).
A natural way to avoid this would be to focus on certain types of allergens and certain 
types of transformations; but, then, the same problem as the degrees of abstraction could 
arise. Another way out would be to limit our attention to some relevant transformations 
22 To put this in the way more conform to the definition of dynamical symmetries, for the former ones it 
makes critical difference whether, for instance, they are exposed to the allergen first and take antihistamine 
only later or the other way around; on the other hand, for those who are indifferent to the substance, the 
order does not matter.
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(e.g., ignoring difference in people’s reactivity to some transformations), but this clearly 
invites interest-relativity.
Another indeterminacy with the account concerns what count as transformations and 
variables that should have relevance to categorizations. For instance, exposure to the same 
verbal expression (such as an insult) can induce very different reactions in different people. 
Do such interventions count as transformations? Also, regarding variables, does the pres-
ence (or absence) of ‘smile’ after some intervention count as a variable that characterizes 
the state of a person, and thus affects categorization of humans?23 If they do, the number of 
transformations and their possible combinations would skyrocket, and the result would be, 
again, a plethora of natural kinds including a very limited number of members, if not just 
one. If they do not, the proponents of DK should provide a natural reason why they should 
be excluded. The upshot is that a similar problem as the boundary problem could arise in 
the DK theory, too.
To be fair, Jantzen requires that the collection of the dynamical symmetries that defines 
a dynamical kind should be non-trivial,24 which may mitigate the issue to some extent. 
However, it remains to be shown exactly how this formal requirement can address the 
above indeterminacies without appealing to human interest.25
4  HPC Without Underlying Mechanisms: Is It All About Stability?
4.1  The Stable Property Cluster Account
As we mentioned in Sect. 1, instead of loosening the notion of mechanism (like Khalidi), 
Slater (2015) tries to address Craver’s challenges to HPC by developing an account of natu-
ral kindness that drops homeostatic mechanisms. In this account, Slater focuses on the very 
stability of the property clusters that homeostatic mechanisms are supposed to generate. In 
other words, Slater focuses on clarifying the feature of property clusters associated with 
natural kinds that enables us to perform inductive inference; then, he proposes using it as 
the defining feature of natural kindness.
This approach yields three main benefits (see Slater 2015, 396). First, it avoids the prob-
lems with mechanisms discussed in Sect.  2 by focusing on what characteristics natural 
kinds need to exhibit in order to serve inductive inference on the kinds’ members. Sec-
ond, the account achieves compelling metaphysical neutrality by avoiding any reference 
to grounding factors for the stability of property clusters (such as essences and homeo-
static mechanisms)—i.e., stability can be realized in many ways. Third, it makes sense of 
23 This is not so unfavorable an example, given that presence or absence of storm is treated as a two-valued 
variable in Woodward’s (2003) interventionist account of causation, based on which Jantzen develops his 
account.
24 Roughly put, this requirement is meant to exclude cases such that there are “external causes that influ-
ence the states of the system [and] that the variables instantiating the symmetry structure are causally dis-
connected” (Jantzen 2015, 3635).
25 As regards the no one-to-one problem, in both cases of Fig. 2, DK seems to dictate categorizing property 
clusters differently depending on their total causal pathway (from the etiological mechanism to the cluster). 
For, when there are differences in the causal pathways leading to the property clusters, there are likely to be 
some transformations such that one of them is affected and the other is not. If this is the case, the indeter-
minacy would be resolved, at least for this problem. However, this only comes with the risk of overly fine-
grained categorizations, and it is not clear whether such an approach conforms to actual scientific practice.
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different kinds of kinds, e.g., essentialist, historical, and HPC kinds. Overall, Slater does 
not deny the value of searching for underlying homeostatic mechanisms in scientific prac-
tice (2015, 402–403), but he believes that this is valuable only in so far as it leads to the 
discovery of further stable property clusters, on the basis of which natural kinds are ulti-
mately identified (according to the SPC account): “When it comes to the projectability of 
a kind, the ontological ground—an essence, a causal homeostatic mechanism—is only a 
means to an epistemically significant end” (Slater 2015, 395).
Then, what sort of property cluster is required for natural kindness? A stable one, of 
course, but not of any sort. According to Slater, natural kindness requires a sort of ‘cliquish 
stability’, intuitively defined as follows: “Spotting Peg, Quinn, and Ralph at the mall means 
that Sarah and Tim [from the same clique] are probably there as well.[…] Call this concep-
tion of stability ‘cliquish stability.’ […] The idea is to capture the fact that some properties 
are clustered in such a way that possession of some of them reliably (if imperfectly) indi-
cates the possession of the whole cluster (if not each property in the cluster) at that time” 
(Slater, 2015, 397).26 Thus, Slater claims that natural kinds are characterized by such stable 
property clusters and calls this view the stable property cluster account (SPC).
It should be noted that Slater’s definition of cliquish stability opens the door for some 
sort of domain-relativity (namely, relativity to the interest of inquiry in a given domain). 
Indeed, cliquishness is characterized as stability under counterfactual situations, and hence, 
the question arises of what counterfactual situations should be taken into account. Slater 
answers that they are those that are relevant to the epistemic practice in question. He also 
claims that it is necessary to relativize natural kinds to physical contexts as well (he calls 
this ‘context-relativity’), for the stability of some property clusters can be maintained only 
under certain physical conditions (such as in vitro conditions) (2015, 404). According to 
Slater, this implies that natural kinds (in the SPC view) are not ontological categories. 
Instead, he suggests thinking of natural kindness “as a sort of status that things or plurality 
of things (from various ontological categories) can have” (2015, 406–407). Although this 
approach certainly invites concerns of relativism, he claims that natural kindness is “under-
standably treated as a fixed, objective matter when it is highly insensitive to the differences 
across our classificatory norms and practices” (406–407) and emphasizes that the account 
does not make natural kinds an arbitrary matter.
Overall, SPC offers a very slender account that provides no straightforward ontological 
basis for natural kinds. Arguably, this will significantly decrease the appeal of the account 
in metaphysical terms. Moreover, SPC may not be able to offer an account of the seman-
tics of natural kind terms (on this point, see Häggqvist and Wikforss 2018). Slater recog-
nizes this issue but argues that, “[g]iven the gain of genuine theoretical unity elsewhere, 
[the problem of semantics] is a potential cost [he is] willing to pay” (2015, 402)—wherein 
‘theoretical unity’ means the generality and the neutrality of SPC we mentioned earlier. 
One may find that these costs are worth paying insofar as the SPC provides an account of 
inductive inference concerning natural kinds. However, does it provide such an account?
4.2  Does SPC Achieve What It Aims for?
SPC aims to answer the question of “what features must kinds have to be ‘apt’ for inductive 
inference” (Slater 2015, 385). In other words, it aims to explicate the nature of property 
26 For the formal definition of cliquishness, see Slater (2015, 400).
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clusters associated with natural kinds only insofar as it is necessary for accounting for 
our inductive practice, putting aside metaphysical questions. However, in what follows, we 
shall argue that SPC fails to account for some of our inductive practice involving natu-
ral kinds: first, inductive inference regarding previously unknown properties and, second, 
inference based on context-dependence of property realization.
Our first concern is that SPC does not provide any account of why it is sometimes rea-
sonable to expect that members of a natural kind that share a number of properties will 
share other previously unknown properties. In the case of ‘thicker’ accounts of natural 
kinds, such as traditional essentialism and the HPC account, those common groundings 
offer the reason. If, for example, various properties of the members of a kind originate from 
a common mechanism, we have reasons to expect that the kinds’ members will also share 
other properties that originate from such mechanism. In the case of SPC kinds, however, 
the same reasoning does not apply because the SPC account lacks reference to any under-
lying mechanism or essence that brings about the shared properties. Thus, when SPCers 
regard a category as ‘a natural kind’ solely based on a cliquishly stable cluster of known 
properties, this does not give them any reason to expect that the kind’s members have other 
properties in common apart from those that have been used to define the category.
For example, Burrows and Sutton (2013) found tiny gears on the hindleg trochanter 
of a planthopper nymph that are used for synchronizing the movement of the legs when 
the nymph jumps. Having identified such a feature in a nymph, it would be reasonable 
to expect that it would be found in other nymphs as well because such a complex feature 
cannot be accidental and there should be some ‘reason’ behind it, be it genetic, selective, 
or developmental. If the notion of natural kind involves the idea that a kind’s members 
share such a ‘reason,’ it is reasonable to expect that other members will possess this feature 
as well. On the other hand, if the notion of natural kind only involves cliquish stability 
of properties, there is no reason to expect that the new property will be shared by other 
nymphs.27 The consideration that the discovered feature does not seem to be accidental 
constitutes an indispensable part of the above reasoning. An account of natural kindness 
that solely focuses on property clusters is unable to account for this sort of inductive infer-
ence in science.
In our understanding, the role of kinds in inductive reasoning is precisely what an 
account of natural kinds is expected to account for. While there is disagreement among 
scholars about how many properties natural kinds should share and how strongly cohesive 
they should be, one of the intuitive differences between natural kinds and arbitrary catego-
rizations is that, while membership in an arbitrary category gives us no reason to expect 
that its members will share properties other than those used to define the category or those 
that can be easily inferred from them, membership in a natural kind gives us such a reason 
(cf. Mill 1846, Vol. 1, Ch. VII §4).
Let us now turn to a second problem with the SPC account. SPC fails to account for 
another important aspect of inductive inference in science, namely, the context dependence 
of property realization. As Khalidi emphasizes, it is not that all the properties of gold stem 
27 An anonymous referee brought to our attention that cliquish stability at some higher-taxa level, too, 
might provide such a reason. However, the issue at stake (i.e., there is no principled reason to believe that 
the newly discovered property belongs to the previously known cliquish property cluster) is likely to hold 
even when the nymph with the previously unknown property shares a number of properties with other 
nymphs in the taxon. Indeed, SPC leaves it open whether the newly discovered property is part of the prop-
erty cluster of the previously known kind (but, for some reason, it was never observed, yet) or rather sug-
gests the existence of a new kind under the same taxon.
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from its atomic number, nor is it that all the samples of gold share more or less the same 
cluster of properties all the time: for instance, its macroscopic properties (such as color, 
luster, density, melting point, and thermal conductivity) stem from its micro-properties 
only when “aggregated in very large numbers and found in certain contexts against certain 
background conditions” (2018, 1384, original emphasis). Knowledge of these conditional 
properties is an essential part of successful inductive practice. This is the aspect that Kha-
lidi tries to capture with his causal graph representation, and it is due to this attention to the 
context-dependent process leading to property clusters that CNN can lump together dif-
ferent property clusters as different states of the same kind (e.g., gold), all stemming from 
the same node (representing the kind) under different conditions. The characterization of 
natural kindness simply as a cliquish clustering of properties seems insufficient to capture 
such inference involving natural kinds.
SPCers might object that the context dependence of property realization can be handled 
simply by relativizing the set of cliquishly stable property clusters to each context. Thus, 
one may argue, ‘gold’ is a kind such that its members cliquishly exhibit such and such prop-
erties under such and such conditions. However, what is missing in this treatment is the rela-
tion among property clusters under different conditions. For example, chemical substances 
and organisms possess very different property clusters under different conditions and at dif-
ferent developmental stages. On what bases can SPCers regard them as the different states of 
the same kind (rather than different kinds), and how can they account for the inductive infer-
ence across different conditions of the same kind? If that relation can also be accommodated 
to SPC in some way, then it is likely that SPC, despite its appearance, turns out to be very 
similar to CNN because it would need to attend to processes underpinning property clusters, 
whether or not one interprets that process as causal or mere propensities.
Chakravartty (2007) clearly sees the importance of such causal relations among properties. 
He holds that, as a matter of metaphysical facts, certain causal properties are systematically 
‘sociable’28 in various degrees, but in addition, these properties also stand in certain relations 
to other properties, as typically summarized in law statements. According to Chakravartty, 
it is this sociability of properties plus the causal relations among them that “underwrite the 
inductive success associated with natural kinds in the sciences” (2007, 170).29 The SPC 
account seems to be attending to only one of these sources of inductive success.
By focusing on explicating what characteristics of natural kinds enable inductive infer-
ence, SPC provides an apparently attractive metaphysically slender account of natural 
kindness. However, the above consideration suggests that reference to some underlying 
causal process constitutes an indispensable part of such an explication. It is then question-
able whether avoidance of reference to underlying causes is a fair cost to pay for a lower 
metaphysical load.
5  Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we argued that the notion of Strict Mechanism, which is widely employed 
in mechanistic explanation, is unsuited to clarify Boyd’s notion of homeostatic mecha-
nism and, in turn, the HPC account of natural kinds. Then, we examined two alternative 
28 Note that Slater also uses the notion of sociability, but in a different way from Chakravartty. The latter’s 
notion of sociability is closer to Slater’s notion of cliquishness.
29 Khalidi’s CNN account can be seen as an attempt to develop this picture by employing causal graph 
representations.
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refinements of cluster theories of kinds. The first one is Khalidi’s causal network node 
account, which replaces homeostatic mechanisms with causal networks (and its nodes) as 
captured by causal graphs. We argued that this account faces the same problems as HPC 
equipped with Strict Mechanism because human interests (purpose of inquiry at hand) play 
indispensable roles in the description of causal graphs and the delineation of categories out 
of them. Also, since such indeterminacy is likely to arise in any approach that bases natural 
kinds on causal processes, we suspect that interest-relativity is an inevitable aspect of natu-
ral kinds. The second alternative we assessed is Slater’s stable property cluster account, 
which dispenses with the metaphysical discussion on the grounding of property clusters 
and focuses instead on explicating the features of property clusters that enable inductive 
inference. We argued that Slater’s model cannot account for some inductive inference on 
natural kinds because consideration of underlying causal process is indispensable for them. 
If these arguments are correct, the delineation of categories based on causal structures will 
involve human interest. What does this sort of interest-relativity mean?
First, it means that there is no ready-made taxonomy on the part of nature until such 
human interest is specified. Second, however, as various scholars pointed out, such interest-
relativity of categories is compatible with their reality or objectivity (see, e.g., Boyd 1999; 
Chakravartty 2007; Dupré 1993). While holding a certain purpose is a human matter, 
whether a given taxonomy is apt for that purpose depends on the way the world is (includ-
ing its modal structure, however it is explicated). In other words, there are some constraints 
posed by nature on the possible taxonomies that serve for a given purpose.30 Thus, interest-
relativity of this sort at most implies pluralism and does not fall into relativism. Also, there 
is still a sense in which those interest-relative categories are ‘natural,’ i.e., in the sense that 
they are parasitic on the causal structure of the world or that they conform to constraints 
of nature (the way the world is). The ‘reality’ or ‘objectivity’ of those kinds could also be 
explicated as that the features exploited for the categorization (theoretical properties such 
as ‘atomic number’ and their supposed causal effects) are the real features of nature (in a 
correspondence sense). Questions about the reality of a given kind term in science will 
then become an empirical issue (if we put aside philosophical skepticism) or a matter for 
the scientific realism debate.
What seems to be missing in the current picture, or seems at least equivocal, is the rel-
ative status of those categories each apt for certain purpose. For example, according to 
Dupré’s promiscuous realism, “there are many equally legitimate ways of dividing the 
world into kinds” (1993, 6, emphasis added), albeit he also acknowledges that “the natural-
ness of kinds will be a matter of degree,” where the degree depends on the extent to which 
members of a kind will share a common essence (1993, 63).31 Chakravartty, on the other 
hand, criticizes Dupré on the latter point and argues that “no classification, so long as it is 
made on the basis of properties in the world […] is more or less objective than any other,” 
allowing that even classification of objects based on just their mass could be objective nat-
ural kinds (2007, 178–179).
30 Here, ‘constraint posed by nature’ means that the range of taxonomies suited for a given purpose is 
restricted by how the world is. However, it also involves restrictions on possible entities that can exist in the 
first place, i.e., restrictions such that certain entities cannot exist (in nature, or for a long time, etc., as is the 
case for some isotopes or genotypes) because of the way the world is.
31 Khalidi also suggests allowing degrees of naturalness along the same line, though he suggests further 
possible dimensions such as the strength of causal relations among properties (2013, 212–213).
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These remarks seem to imply that all interest-relative categories can be treated as 
equally ‘natural’ insofar as they are parasitic on some objective causal feature. However, 
allowing too permissive notions of naturalness, reality, or objectivity of interest-relative 
kinds, and treating every taxonomy equally in this respect, risks to miss the point at stake 
in some discursive contexts. For instance, it is widely known in Japan that Echizen crab 
and Matsuba crab, despite their huge differences in taste and price, belong to the same 
biological species; namely, they are just ‘brand’ names indicating where those crabs are 
landed. When people say that the distinction between the two crabs is ‘not real’ or is arti-
ficial, they do not mean that the taxonomy is not based on any objective feature, nor that 
it is not apt for any purpose at all. Rather, what they mean seems to be that the distinction 
is made for a very particular purpose of human cuisine and the related economic inter-
est. Thus, ‘naturalness’ or ‘reality’ of category (or lack thereof) is here used to mark such 
contrast in the generality of the purpose those taxonomies are made for.32 In such cases, it 
would be odd to suggest to treat all interest-relative categories on a par just because they 
are parasitic on some objective causal features. This would fail to capture what is really at 
stake in the discourse (i.e., the contrast in generality of purpose).
Likewise, when people discuss whether a given category (such as human race) is natu-
ral, what is meant by the question could be whether/to what extent it is due to social con-
straints or biological ones (in other words, how contingent it is on the societal factor). In 
such cases, it would be odd to suggest treating any taxonomy of human populations on 
a par as far as they are based on some causal properties (including those effective in a 
given social setting). This would fail to capture what is really at stake in the discourse (i.e., 
social/biological contrast).
These considerations suggest that there are both epistemic and pragmatic aspects in the 
notion of natural kinds, and that they are relative to human interests in differing ways. Epis-
temic aspects concern the ability of categories to support inductive inference, and differing 
status of categories is, as we argued, characterized by their aptness for various purposes 
of inquiry, which in turn are parasitic on causal structure—on this aspect, Chakravartty’s 
account (2007) is very close to our own view. On the other hand, pragmatic aspects con-
cern the function that the notion of natural kinds (or ‘natural,’ ‘objective,’ ‘real’ taxono-
mies) plays in a given discourse (i.e., what contrast such notions are intended to make in a 
given discourse, such as those in generality of purpose, or biological/social contrast). For 
this aspect, it is not clear whether the differing status of categories is characterized by their 
aptness for certain purposes (as in the case of the epistemic aspect), for there is not always 
any particular purpose in the discourse (e.g., people do not need any particular purpose to 
wonder whether there is a real difference between crabs or human races in the sense dis-
cussed above). Rather, the differing status of categories in the pragmatic sense would be 
better captured by reference to the contrast at stake in each discursive context.
Although it is natural that philosophers of science have mostly focused on the epistemic 
aspect, treating categories on a par based on the analysis of such aspect may miss their 
difference in the pragmatic aspect, and this may lead philosophers to give somewhat odd 
32 This is not to say that biological species concept is free from any human interest, nor that all categories 
can be linearly ordered in terms of their generality of purpose. Dupré also recognizes the difference in the 
degree of anthropocentrism involved in scientific taxonomy and ordinary language classifications (1993, 
35). Note also that this difference in ‘naturalness’ is not necessarily characterized as the extent to which 
members share common properties, as Dupré’s (1993) comment in the previous paragraph suggests. For, in 
this respect, members of the brand-name categories of crabs share more properties (e.g., flavors characteris-
tic of each brand) than when they are put under the same biological category.
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adjudications on actual cases in which naturalness, reality, or objectivity of categories are 
in question. It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explicate the pragmatic aspect, but 
a complete account of natural kinds will require further research on such aspects.
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